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Il lavoro utilizza un modello teorico per studiare i possibili effetti
dell’orientamento anti-inflazionistico della banca centrale (“conservatorismo”) sui
comportamenti in sede di contrattazione salariale. Nella letteratura economica è diffusa la
proposizione secondo cui, in presenza di aspettative razionali, un aumento del
“conservatorismo” della politica monetaria riduce il tasso medio d’inflazione ma non ha
effetti su quello di disoccupazione. Nel modello presentato, invece, il “conservatorismo” della
politica monetaria può influenzare anche il livello medio (o tasso “naturale”) di
disoccupazione, se sul mercato del lavoro operano sindacati sufficientemente grandi da
internalizzare le ripercussioni inflazionistiche delle proprie azioni.
Il modello è basato su una configurazione oligopolistica del mercato del lavoro. In
presenza di una banca centrale fortemente avversa all’inflazione, ogni sindacato può essere
indotto a strategie salariali più moderate perché realizza che l’impatto di un aumento salariale
sull’occupazione dei propri iscritti è maggiore. In termini intuitivi, si riduce la possibilità di
“trasferire” su altri soggetti parte del costo derivante da un aumento salariale. La riduzione di
tale esternalità accresce la disciplina salariale e favorisce l’occupazione, attraverso la
predisposizione di un contesto economico in cui ogni agente internalizza pienamente le
conseguenze delle proprie azioni.675$7(*,& 021(7$5< 32/,&< :,7+ 121$720,67,& :$*(6(77(56
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This paper proposes a monetary policy game based on a microfounded general
equilibrium model. The approach allows some key features of the policy game (such as the
policy maker’s gap between desired and “natural” output) to be related to basic technological
and preference parameters. Moreover, it shows how results are affected by the presence of
non-atomistic private agents. A main ¿nding which is emphasized here is that, with non-
atomistic labor unions, the policy maker’s aversion to inÀation may have a permanent effect
on employment even if all agents have rational expectations and complete information. The
traditional result, whereby equilibrium employment is unrelated to the policy maker’s aversion
to inÀation, is obtained as a special case when private agents are atomistic. The model is used
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1
Several contributions to the strategic monetary policy literature establish that policy
makers’ attempts to raise employment above the “natural” rate are futile and result in an
inÀationary bias when wage setters have rational expectations and policy makers cannot
precommit. A key feature of this literature, initiated by the seminal contributions of Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), is that monetary policy does not have
permanent effects on real variables.
This view of monetary policy is at the basis of the argument, put forth by Rogoff (1985),
that social welfare can be improved by delegating monetary policy to an independent central
bank that assigns a greater weight to inÀation than society does. Such a “conservative” (and
independent) central bank reduces the inÀationary bias without having a permanent effect on
the employment level.
This paper presents a monetary policy game, based on a simple microfounded general
equilibrium model, to reexamine previous results based on an “aggregate” supply curve. An
appealing feature of this approach is that it allows some key features of policy games, usually
treatedas H[RJHQRXVin previous literature(e.g. thepolicy maker’s desired output and “natural”
output) to be related to the economy’s technology, market structure and to the representative
agent’s consumption/leisure preferences. Moreover, the model allows the size of the private
sector agents who interact with the monetary authority to be parametrized. One of the main
results delivered by the latter feature is that with a QRQDWRPLVWLF private sector (rational wage
setters with complete information), the central bank conservatism may have a long-run effect
on equilibrium employment. The “standard” result, whereby equilibrium employment is
unrelated to central bank conservatism, is obtained as a special case when wage setters are
atomistic. As summarized in the concluding section, our ¿ndings qualify Rogoff’s proposition
on the welfare effects of a “conservative” central bank and are consistent with preliminary
empiricalevidenceon continentalEuropean countries markedbythepresenceofnon-atomistic
labor unions.
4 I thank Luca Dedola, Hubert Kempf and Fabiano Schivardi for several useful comments on a previous
draft of the paper and Paolo Angelini, Giancarlo Corsetti, Eugenio Gaiotti, Patrizio Pagano, Ken Rogoff, Michele
Ruta, Guido Tabellini, Michael Woodford and seminar participants in the Banca d’Italia lunch seminars for
fruitful discussions. Any remaining errors are mine. The views are personal and do not involve the responsibility
of the institutions with which the author is af¿liated. E-mail: lippi@dada.it.8
The model features a representative ¿rm that produces output using labor inputs supplied
by a number of unions (i.e. organizations that sell the labor of a group of workers). Imperfect
substitutability of labor inputs gives unions monopoly power. In such model equilibrium
employment is below the optimal level, the more so the greater the monopoly power of unions,
i.e. the lower the real wage elasticity of labor demand. The key feature of the model is that
the conservatism of monetary policy affects this elasticity and therefore inÀuences equilibrium
employment.
An intuitiveaccount ofthemechanismthroughwhichconservatismaffectslabordemand
elasticity is as follows: a large union (let us call it “U”) understands that an increase in
the nominal wage of its members raises inÀation. When QRPLQDO wages are bargained
simultaneously in an uncoordinated manner, U perceives that higher inÀation, caused by its
own wage setting, reduces the UHDOwages of the other unions. This makes the labor of the other
unions more competitive, reducing the demand for the labor of U. Crucially, if the central bank
is more conservative, U’s wage increase results in less inÀation and hence the demand for U’s
labor falls by a smaller amount (since the decline in the other unions’ real wages is reduced).
Hence, a more conservative central bank may induce more aggressive wage behavior. This is
the ¿rst effect of conservatism on the unions’ employment choices. The second occurs when
unions internalize the general equilibrium consequences of their choices. The demand for U’s
labor is positively related to the economy’s production scale, which is inversely related to the
average (economy-wide) real wage. Therefore U perceives that the decline in production (and
hence in demand for its labor) due to its own wage increase is larger if the central bank is more
conservativebecausethereductionintheotherunions’realwagesissmaller(hencetheaverage
real wage increases by a greater amount). This second effect suggests that a more conservative
central bank may induce less aggressive wage demands. When the ¿rst effect dominates, the
model predicts that a more conservative central bank lowers equilibrium employment.
2
Some related contributions investigate the assumptions under which central bank
conservatism affects equilibrium employment in monetary policy games with rational non-
atomistic (and non-money illuded) unions.
3 Among the ¿rst to highlight such effects
5 It is emphasized that the results do not hinge on“money illusion” or on other forms of “myopic” behavior
on the part of the unions.
6 A related strand of literature shows that monetary policy can have real effects when unions are inÀation
averse (see footnote 4 in Cukierman and Lippi, 1999).9
are Jensen (1993) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) who show that a more conservative
monetary policy induces unions to be more aggressive in their wage requests, reducing
structural employment.
4 Interestingly, Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000) show
that a higher degree of conservatism may cause an opposite effect (greater employment) if
unions internalize the aggregate demand repercussions of their individual actions.
5 Compared
with these contributions, this paper displays two novelties: (i) it nests both an employment-
increasing and an employment-decreasing effect of conservatism within the same model and
(ii) it is consistently based on a microfounded general equilibrium model. The latter allows
us to identify microeconomic features determining the sign of the employment effect of
conservatism.
6
The paper is organized as follows. The economy, the agent’s preferences and a
benchmark command-economy equilibrium are presented in the next section. The agents’
strategies and the equilibrium outcomes under discretionary policy are derived in Section 3.
The employment effects of monetary policy are described in Section 4. The optimal monetary
policy delegation and the optimal (time-inconsistent) policy are analyzed in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. The robustness of the results with respect to alternative assumptions about union
behavior is presented in Section 7. This is followed by concluding remarks in Section 8.
 7KH PRGHO
We consider an economy in which a single consumption good can be produced using
imperfectly substitutable labor inputs. The economy is populated by a pro¿t-maximizing
competitive representative ¿rm and a continuum of symmetric workers (indexed by  and
arranged in the unit interval) who supply labor, receive dividends from the ¿rm, and consume.
7 Holden (1999) and Soskice and Iversen (1999) study the employment effects of alternative monetary
policy rules. Those papers, while useful for understanding the effect of an exogenously given policy rule on
economic outcomes, abstract from the time-consistency problem to which such rules may be subject (see Section
6).
8 It is assumed that the central bank directly controls the inÀation rate. Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo
provide a more realistic description of monetary transmission by assuming that the central bank controls the
money supply.
9 Neiss (1999) proposes a general equilibrium microfounded analysis of a monetary policy game in which
the welfare effects of inÀation are also explicitly related to the underlying preferences and technology of the
private economy. She does not consider, however, the case of a non-atomistic private sector.10
Workers are organized in ?   unions, indexed by , each of which has a set of members of
measure ?3￿ on whose behalf it sets nominal wages.
7
At w o -stage game is considered. In the ¿rst stage unions choose the nominal wages
of their members simultaneously, knowing the subsequent reaction of monetary policy. The
Nash equilibrium of this wage-setting game yields the economy-wide growth in nominal
wages. After observing this outcome, monetary policy determines inÀa t i o ni nt h es e c o n d
stage. Finally, employment and output are chosen by the ¿rms after observing the negotiated
nominal wages and the rate of inÀation. The game is solved by backward induction.
2.1 7KH ¿UP
The representative ¿rm is price taker in both the output and the input markets. The ¿rm
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where u￿ is the labor input supplied by worker c j is labor substitution elasticity and k is a
return to scale parameter. The ¿rm maximizes pro¿ts, ( ' t 
U ￿
f `￿u￿_, subject to (1),
taking real wages (`￿) as given. The solution to this problem yields a labor demand function


















: The model differs from Guzzo and Velasco (1999), by which it was inspired, for two important reasons.
First, we solve the model under the assumption that the unions’ strategic choice variable is the nominal wage.
As shown by Lippi (1999), Guzzo and Velasco’s results are not consistent with this assumption, which implies
that their alleged “equilibrium” is not a Nash equilibrium. Second, we assume that unions are not interested in
inÀation SHU VH to show that, even in this case, monetary policy conservatism may affect real outcomes. This does
not occur in Guzzo and Velasco due to their erroneous characterization of equilibrium outcomes under nominal
wage bargaining.11








Denoting dividends paid to worker  by (￿, in equilibrium we have






E  k (5)
2.2 :RUNHUV DQG XQLRQV
Workers earn wage income and dividends and derive utility from consumption and
leisure. Worker ’s utility is




2 c : k (6)
where  is a preference parameter and ￿ is consumption.
8 The representative union





The union targets the VDPH utility level for each of its members since workers’ preferences,
the way their labor enters into the ¿rm’s technology, and the weights the union places on the
workers’ welfare, are identical. In the special case in which the number of unions goes to
in¿nity each union coincides with a worker (the atomistic case).












; Two conditions have to be satis¿ed by the utility function. The ¿rst is that work produces disutility
(CXl






l +4  orjOl, ? 3> requiring orjOl ? 4). The assumption Aimplies that in equilibrium 3 ? orjOl ? 4
(see subsection 3.3) and hence that both conditions are satis¿ed.12
It is hypothesized that unions, no matter how large, take (￿ as given when setting wages.
9 The
representative worker’s budget constraint thus is
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where Z is the inÀation rate and /￿ is the percent increase in the nominal wage of worker .
10
Let the strategic choice variable of union  be the nominal wage growth of its members,












whichimpliesthat, ina symmetric equilibrium, union perceives that its nominal wagegrowth





2.3 7KH FHQWUDO EDQN









2 cq : f (12)
where ZW is the inÀation objective of the central bank and the parameter q is its inÀation
aversion (relative to consumption and leisure). The central bank objectives differ from the
< Appendix F shows that neither the assumption that unions internalize the effect of wages on output (used
in 8) nor the exogeneity of dividends are necessary for monetary policy to inÀuence structural employment.
43 The previousperiodreal wage isnormalizedtounitywithout lossofgeneralitysinceequilibriumoutcomes
do not depend on it (see section 3.3).








4.$m,￿ where the last equality holds since the wages of union m’s workers are identical. In a
symmetric equilibrium, where the wages of all unions are identical, then $ @ $m and g$
g$m @ 4
q=13
unions’ objectives in that the central bank considers DOO workers in the economy and it also
cares about inÀation.
12 Moreover, the central bank does not take (￿ as given. Therefore it
















￿ 3 k (13)
2.4 $ EHQFKPDUN WKH FRPPDQG HFRQRP\
As a benchmark, it is useful to compute the equilibrium employment and inÀation that
would be chosen by a benevolent planner, who sets real wages and inÀation so as to maximize
the welfare of workers and of the central bank. The optimal inÀation rate is ZW since inÀation
does not enter the workers’ utility directly. The optimal real wage (and hence employment)
is obtained from the maximization of (6) subject to ((2) and (4)). The solution to this
problem shows that the employment level that maximizes the workers’ welfare is *L}u ' k
￿,
which equates the consumption/leisure marginal rate of substitution ( *L}u)t ot h e( e f ¿ cient)
technical rate of transformation (*k). The corresponding real wage is `￿ ' *L}k k
￿Ek
(for all ’s).
 'LVFUHWLRQDU\ SROLF\ HTXLOLEULXP
3.1 7KH UHDFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ RI PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ WR QRPLQDO ZDJHV
Thecentralbank maximizes(12)with respecttoZ subjectto(8)and (13), takingnominal




 d/  E`JR| n ZWo n  E  kj
U ￿
f E/￿  /_
E  k
2 q n 
 (14)
45 As argued by Woodford (1999), the central bank concern with inÀation might be justi¿e d ,i naw a yc o n -
sistent with the individual utilities represented by equation (6), by the existence of asynchronous price-setting
rules. In such a case inÀation increases the deadweight losses associated with relative price distortions. Follow-
ing Woodford’s model, one might thus built a fully microfounded model where the central bank objectives, in
terms of consumption, leisure DQG inÀation, are consistently derived from individual utilities. For simplicity and
focus this is not done here, as that would require the modeling of a staggered wage-setting process.14
Equation (14) captures the incentive problem faced by the central bank: in a symmetric
equilibrium (where /￿ ' / for all ), inÀation equals the desired level ZW if nominal wages
satisfy / ' ` JR| n ZWc where `JR|  *L}k  k
￿E  k is the real wage at which the
optimal employment level is reached (*L}u ' k
￿( see Section 2.4). Intuitively, this shows
that if nominal wages are consistent with the optimal employment level DQG with the optimal
inÀation rate, then it will be optimal for the central bank to choose the inÀation rate ZW But
if nominal wages are above the optimal value (` JR| n ZW), then the equilibrium inÀation rate
is higher than desired. This effect is due to the time-inconsistency of the optimal monetary
policy: since for /:` JR| nZW the real wage is above its optimal level at Z ' ZWc the central
bank has an incentive to raise inÀation above ZW in order to reduce real wages, as in Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Naturally, by how much inÀation increases
above ZW also depends on the central bank inÀation aversion (q).
Key to our results is that a non-atomistic union perceives that the growth of its nominal
w a g e sr a i s e si n À ation, in a way which is determined by (14). The perceived impact effect of











2 q n 
  rEqc? 5 Efc (15)
which will be labeled r
13 It appears that the impact effect depends on the central bank inÀation
aversion and on the size of the union. Atomistic unions (? $4 ) perceive their impact on
inÀation (r) is zero. A non-atomistic union, instead, perceives that an increase in its nominal
wages increases the inÀation rate (r:f ), and that this increase is smaller if the central bank
is more inÀation averse.
3.2 :DJH VHWWLQJ
Under simultaneous wage bargaining the typical union  maximizes (7) with respect to
/￿, subject to (8), (9) and (14), taking /3￿ as given. The ¿rst order condition implies (see
46 Equation (15) gives the impact effect of $m on inÀation evaluated DW a V\PPHWULF equilibrium, where all
wages are identical. This implies that in the derivative of (14) with respect to $m the term g
g$m
kU 4
3 +$l  $,gl
l
is
equal to zero. Symmetry is assumed because later we will analyze each union’s incentive to deviate from a
V\PPHWULF Nash equilibrium of the wage setting game. Indeed, we will show that one symmetric equilibrium
exists. The issue of whether there are other asymmetric equilibria is not considered here.15
Appendix B)
kd  #on#*L}u￿ 'f (16)
where # rthe real wage elasticity of labor demand,
















E  k2q n 
?
?3￿E  k2q n 
5 Ec4 (17)
Equation (16) indicates that an increase in the wages of union  has two opposing effects on
the utility of workers: on one hand, it decreases utility since it reduces consumption (the ¿rst
term in (16)). On the other hand, it increases utility since it raises leisure. Equation (16) shows
that the union trades off these marginal costs and bene¿ts according to its consumption/leisure
preferences ().
3.3 (TXLOLEULXP RXWFRPHV XQGHU GLVFUHWLRQDU\ SROLF\
Since unions are identical, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium (where u￿ ' u for all










Employment is increasing in the elasticity of labor demand, #c i.e. it is inversely related to
the monopolistic power of each union.
15 Equations (30) and (18) yield the equilibrium rate of










Equation (19) con¿rms Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) result:
if output is below its optimal level, which occurs when unions have monopolistic power
(#	4 ) the central bank has an incentive to reduce real wages which, in equilibrium, leads
to an inÀationary bias, i.e. an inÀation rate that is higher than the optimal rate ZW (Section
47 The union’s QRPLQDO wage growth (the unions’ strategic choice variable) is mapped into UHDO wage growth,
according to:
gorjZm
g$m @4v(see appendix B).
48 The (symmetric) equilibrium output and consumption levels are orj\ @ orjF @ orjO=16
2.4).
16 Note that this occurs even though the central bank is EHQHYROHQW, in the sense that its
preferences about consumption and leisure coincide with those of the private sector.
3.4 :HOIDUH
There are two sources of inef¿ciency in the model. The ¿rst is that unions have
monopolistic power. The second is that they take dividends as given when setting wages.
Replacing equilibrium outcomes into the workers’ welfare function it appears that welfare is
an increasing function of the labor demand elasticity, #. The same is true of the central bank
welfare.
17 Thus, theexpression ￿
# measureshowfar theeconomyisfromtheoptimum. The¿rst
best is achieved when the elasticity is in¿nite (# $4 ) so that unions have no monopolistic
power and the optimal employment level, *L}u ' k
￿, is achieved. In this case, moreover, the
inÀation bias disappears since the central bank’s incentive to raise employment vanishes. We
summarize the ¿ndings of this section in:
Proposition 1  ,I QRQDWRPLVWLF XQLRQV ZLWK PRQRSRO\ SRZHU VHW QRPLQDO ZDJHV LQ DQ
XQFRRUGLQDWHG PDQQHU WKHQ HTXLOLEULXP HPSOR\PHQW LV VXERSWLPDO
 ,I LQ DGGLWLRQ WR  PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ LV GLVFUHWLRQDU\ WKH HFRQRP\ LV VXEMHFW WR DQ
LQÀDWLRQDU\ ELDV
 $Q LQFUHDVH LQ WKH ODERU GHPDQG HODVWLFLW\ UDLVHV HPSOR\PHQW DQG UHGXFHV LQÀDWLRQ
LQFUHDVLQJ WKH ZHOIDUH RI ERWK WKH ZRUNHUV DQG WKH PRQHWDU\ DXWKRULWLHV
 )HDWXUHV RI HTXLOLEULXP RXWFRPHV
4.1 0RQHWDU\ SROLF\ DQG WKH HODVWLFLW\ RI ODERU GHPDQG
A novel feature of the model is that the central bank aversion to inÀation, qc affects the
real wage elasticity of labor demand. To see why this occurs, it is necessary to understand the
impact effect of a unit increase in the real wages of union  on the aggregate real wage `,f o r
49 ￿ is also the optimal (time-inconsistent) inÀation rate (see Section 6).














given nominal wages of the other unions (/3￿). Equation (3) and (15) are used to calculate


























The impact is given by a direct effect of `￿ on ` (*?), proportional to the size of union c
and by an indirect effect (
E?3￿￿r
?E￿3r￿). The latter occurs because the increase in inÀation, caused by
’s higher real (and nominal) wages, reduces the otherunions’ real wages by raising inÀation.
18
It is important for our purposes to note that this impact depends on the central bank
aversion to inÀation (q): the larger is q, the smaller is r, hence the perceived impact of a
union’s real wage on the aggregate real wage is larger, since the other unions’ real wages are
reduced by a smaller amount. These ¿ndings are summarized in:
Remark 1E The impact effect of a unit increase in the real wages of union  on the aggregate
real wage is positive. E If  	?	4this impact increases with the central bank degree
of inÀation aversion (q).












: f. Thisproves E If 	?	4 ,
this expression is increasing in q, otherwise it is constant. This proves E




























Equation (21) shows that the employment effect of higher real wages, as perceived by union
c depends on the impact of `￿ on the aggregate real wage (`) and the relative wage term
(
‘￿
‘ ). The former impact can be labelled the “adverse output” effect this is due to the fact that
an increase in `￿ increases `, lowering output and hence decreasing aggregate labor demand
(see equations 4 and 8). The latter impact can be labelled the “adverse competitiveness” effect
4; Recall that we assumed that each union negotiates nominal wages taking the other unoins’ nominal wages
as given. A unit increase in the real wage corresponds to a nominal wage increase equal to 4
4￿v> which raises
inÀation by v
4￿v units. Hence the other unions’ real wages fall by the same amount (see Appendix C). The
reduction of the aggregate real wage due to this effect is given by the fall of the other unions’ wages ( v
4￿v)
times their weight in the aggregate real wage ( q￿4
q ).18
this is due to the fact that a higher `￿ increases the wages of union  relative to the wages of
the other unions (
‘￿
‘ rises), inducing ¿rms to substitute union ￿s labor varieties.
Key to the employment effect of monetary policy is that both the “adverse output” and
the “adverse competitiveness” effect depend on the central bank inÀation aversion. A higher
q has two opposed effects: ¿rst, it LQFUHDVHV the impact of `￿ on the aggregate real wage
(Remark 1) this effect raises labor demand elasticity (#) because it increases the size of the
“adverse output” effect. Second, a higher q GHFUHDVHV the impact of `￿ on
‘￿
‘  this effect
lowers labor demand elasticity because it makes each union perceive that a unit increase in `￿
is associated with a smaller “adverse competitiveness” effect.
Hence, the total effect of a higher inÀation aversion on labor demand elasticity
depends on whether the increased “adverse output” effect dominates the reduced “adverse
competitiveness” effect. Since ￿
￿3k is the labor demand elasticity with respect to the aggregate
real wage and j is the elasticity with respect to the relative wage, the total effect of q on # is
positive if the increase in the “adverse output” effect outweighs the reduction in the “adverse
competitiveness” effect. This happens if jE  k 	 . The partial derivative of (17) with











2 q n ?3￿
? 
2 (22)
which leads us to
Remark 2(L)F o r	?	4 cthe impact effect of the central bank inÀation aversion on labor
demand elasticity,
_#
_q, is positive when jEk 	  (i.e. when the “adverse output” effect
of an increase in `￿ dominates the “adverse competitiveness” effect) it is negative when
jE  k : .( LL)F o re i t h e r?'or ? $4 cthe impact effect is nil (
_#
_q 'f ).
3URRI If  	?	4 cthe sign of (22) is positive for jE  k 	 c negative otherwise. This
proves () When one of the conditions speci¿ed under () holds, the derivative is equal to
zero. This proves ().
4.2 &HQWUDO EDQN SUHIHUHQFHV DQG HPSOR\PHQW




_q which immediately leads
us to:19
Proposition 2 L )RU  	?	4 cWKH LPSDFW HIIHFW RI WKH FHQWUDO EDQN LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ
RQ HPSOR\PHQW _u
_q LV SRVLWLYH ZKHQ jE  k 	  LH ZKHQ WKH ³DGYHUVH RXWSXW´ HIIHFW
RI DQ LQFUHDVH LQ `￿ GRPLQDWHV WKH ³DGYHUVH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV´ HIIHFW LW LV QHJDWLYH ZKHQ
jE  k : 
LL )RU HLWKHU ? 'RU ? $4 cWKH LPSDFW HIIHFW LV QLO _u
_q 'f 
LLL (PSOR\PHQW LV XQUHODWHG WR WKH LQÀDWLRQ WDUJHW ZW  _u
_ZW 'f 
This result is implied by Proposition 1.() and Remark 2. As shown in the previous
subsection, an increase in the inÀation aversion of the central bank raises the labor demand
elasticity when the “adverse output” effect dominates the “adverse competitiveness” effect
(i.e. if jE  k 	 ). Hence, when the degree of substitutability between labor types (j)
is suf¿ciently low, a more inÀation averse central bank makes unions perceive higher labor
demand elasticity, which causes them to choose lower real wages (higher employment).
19
The assumption that wages are negotiated in QRPLQDO terms, which is essential to
credibility models, is key for the above result. It is precisely because each union takes other
unions’ nominal wages as given when choosing its nominal wage that the policy maker’s
inÀation aversion has real effects. The assumptions of non-atomism and uncoordinated wage
setting are also essential for the result. Traditional “neutrality” results are obtained as a special
case when unions are atomistic (? $4 ) or in the extreme case of a single all-encompassing
union (? ' ), since in neither case unions perceive they can affect the real wages of the other
unions.
Finally, Proposition 2 states that the central bank’s inÀation target (ZW) does not affect
employment ( _u
_ZW 'f ). To understand this, note that ZW inÀuences the intercept of the central
bank’s reaction function to nominal wages but not its slope (equation 14 in theZc/ plane). It is
the slope of the reaction function that matters to unions’ decisions since it determines by how
much inÀation LQFUHDVHV in response to higher wages. Since the slope of the reaction function
is unaffected by a change in ZW, a change of the latter does not affect employment.
4< Note that in the extreme case of perfect substitutability ( $4 ) labor demand elasticity ()i si n ¿ nite,
provided there is more than one union. This eliminates the unions’ monopoly power, leading to a ¿rst best
outcome. Thus, the employment effect only occurs when ?4and qA4 .20
4.3 &HQWUDO EDQN SUHIHUHQFHV DQG LQÀDWLRQ












When unions are atomistic the central bank aversion to inÀation does not affect labor demand
elasticity(
_#
_q 'f ). In suchacase, ahigherq reduces inÀationviaa“direct”effect, namely that
the central bank incentives to inÀate are diminished. With non-atomistic unions an additional
effect appears. A higher q may change the employment level, as shown above, thus affecting
the central bank’s incentives to inÀate. When
_#
_q : f, a higher q raises employment (see
Proposition 2). This effect cumulates on top of the “direct” one, reinforcing the negative
impact of q on inÀation.
Instead, when more conservatism reducesemployment E
_#
_q 	 f,t h e¿nal inÀation effect
of a higher q depends on two opposed effects: on one hand, the “direct” effect, via the central
bank’s motives, reduces inÀation (for any given employment) on the other hand, a lower
employment increases inÀation (for any given q). Simple algebra shows that the “direct”
effect always dominates. We summarize these results with:
Proposition 3  $KLJKHUGHJUHH RIWKH SROLF\ PDNHU¶VLQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQq UHGXFHVLQÀDWLRQ
_Z
_q 	 f
 ,Q FRPSDULVRQ WR WKH FDVH LQ ZKLFK PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ LV QHXWUDO LH ZKHQ
_#
_q 'f 
WKH UHGXFWLRQ LQ LQÀDWLRQ LV ODUJHU LQ DEVROXWH YDOXH ZKHQ WKH LPSDFW RI LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ RQ
HPSOR\PHQW LV SRVLWLYH 
_#
_q : f LW LV VPDOOHU ZKHQ WKH LPSDFW LV QHJDWLYH 
_#
_q 	 f
4.4 (PSOR\PHQW HIIHFWV RI ZDJH VHWWLQJ GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ
Let us consider the effects of the degree of wage bargaining decentralization (measured
by the number of unions that bargain wages independently) on economic performance. The














2 q nE ?
2 (24)21
which shows that a variationin thenumberof unions changestheelasticity oflabordemand. In
particular, the elasticity either increases or decreases with the number of unions depending on
whether the degree of labor substitutability (j)i s“suf¿ciently high”. Part ()o fP r o p o s i t i o n
1 and equation (24) imply
Proposition 4 7KH LPSDFW HIIHFW RI WKH GHJUHH RI GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ ? RQ HPSOR\PHQW _u
_?L V
SRVLWLYH LI jE  k :  LH ZKHQ WKH ³DGYHUVH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV´ HIIHFW RI DQ LQFUHDVH LQ `￿
GRPLQDWHV WKH ³DGYHUVH RXWSXW´ HIIHFW LW LV QHJDWLYH LI jE  k 	 
The mechanism that determines the ¿n a li m p a c to f?on #cand hence on uc is analogous
to the one that was discussed for the impact of q on # As ? increases, the impact of `￿ on
` decreases, but the impact on
‘￿
‘ increases. Thus, a larger ? softens the “adverse output”
effect and exacerbates the “adverse competitiveness” effect. As before, the total effect of ? on
# depends on whether the relative-wage elasticity of labor demand (j)i sl a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a n
the aggregate real wage elasticity ( ￿
￿3k).
Note that in the case of monopolistic competition, i.e. when ? $4 , the labor
demand elasticity is equal to j, which is the substitution elasticity of labor varieties. Hence,
employment and inÀation in a fully decentralized labor market are given by equations (18)
and (19) where # is replaced by j. Of course, even in a fully decentralized labor market
the equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal (employment is below - and inÀation above - the
optimal level) if unions have market power (j	4 ). The equilibrium outcomes converge to
their optimal level only if j $4 . In this case, the perfect substitutability of labor varieties
eliminates the monopolistic power of wage setters, restoring ef¿ciency.
 &HQWUDO EDQN GHOHJDWLRQ ZLWK QRQDWRPLVWLF XQLRQV
The idea that welfare can increase by delegating monetary policy to an independent
central bank that attaches JUHDWHU weight to inÀation than society has gained popularity since
Rogoff’s (1985) important contribution. This section investigates the robustness of that idea
in the presence of non-atomistic unions.
If the private sector is atomistic (and employment is thus unrelated to the bank’s inÀation
aversion) an optimal delegation prescribes the assignment of monetary policy to a central22
bank that is concerned VROHO\ with inÀation (i.e. q $4 ). It is known that if there is
a role for stabilization policy, for instance due to an information advantage of the central
bank over a supply shock, an optimal delegation involves a central bank concerned with ERWK
employment and inÀation (Rogoff, 1985 Lohmann, 1992). Here we deliberately abstract from
the stabilizing role of monetary policy, by focusing on a deterministic economy, to show that
if the private sector is non-atomistic an optimal delegation involves a central bank which is not
solely concerned with inÀation even in a setting without shocks.
Let us consider a government, whose preferences are assumed to be given by (12), who










2 c  q:f (25)
which differ from those of the government only in the weight attached to inÀation ( q instead
of q). We will say that a central bank is FRQVHUYDWLYH if  q is larger than qc that it is OLEHUDO
if  q is smaller than q. The government problem is to choose that value of  q that maximizes
its welfare (equation 12). In making this choice the government knows that, when monetary
policy is in the hands of a central bank of type  q, economic outcomes are determined by
equations (18), (19) and by elasticity (17), where the variable  q appears in the place of q.T h e
solution to this problem yields (see Appendix D for the proof.)
Proposition 5 ,Q D GHWHUPLQLVWLF HFRQRP\ ZLWK QRQDWRPLVWLF XQLRQV WKH RSWLPDO GHJUHH RI
LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ IRU DQ LQGHSHQGHQW FHQWUDO EDQN  q
JR|
 LV




_￿ q  f




_￿ q 	 f DQG WKH JRYHUQPHQW LV VXI¿FLHQWO\
FRQFHUQHG DERXW LQÀDWLRQ




_￿ q 	 f DQG WKH JRYHUQPHQW LV QRW VXI¿FLHQWO\
FRQFHUQHG DERXW LQÀDWLRQ
Proposition 5 shows that three cases can be distinguished. The ¿rst occurs when a higher
level of central bank inÀation aversion does not lower labor demand elasticity (
_#
_￿ q  f). In
this case the government incentives to delegate monetary policy to a conservative banker are23
greater than in the traditional (atomistic) case since, as  q rises, both employment (Proposition
2) and inÀation (Proposition 3) improve in comparison with discretionary policy.
The two remaining cases occur when a higher level of inÀa t i o na v e r s i o nr e d u c e sl a b o r
demand elasticity (
_#
_￿ q 	 f). In this case, policy delegation to a conservative central bank
( q:q ) involves a tradeoff between lower employment (lower workers’ welfare) and lower
inÀation. Part () of Proposition 5 shows that if the government is suf¿ciently interested in
inÀation, then VRPH conservatism of monetary policy is optimal (i.e. q	 q
JR|
	 4). This
shows that even in the absence of a well de¿ned role for stabilization policy a government
may be reluctant to delegate monetary policy to an agent that is H[FOXVLYHO\ concerned with
inÀation, due to its adverse impact on employment.
Finally, when the government’s concern with inÀation is “suf¿ciently low” (part ()o f
Proposition 5), it may be optimal to appoint a central banker who attaches a ORZHU weight to
inÀation than the government (but still larger than zero), what we referred to as a “liberal”
central bank (i.e. f 	  q
JR|
	q ). In this case, the government is willing to reap some
employment bene¿ts at the expense of higher inÀation.
 7KH RSWLPDO WLPHLQFRQVLVWHQW PRQHWDU\ SROLF\
This section studies the optimal time-inconsistent monetary policy for the case of non-
atomistic unions. Let us assume the monetary policy reaction function is




where  & and & are constant (publicly known) parameters to be determined by the central bank
before the unions set wages. This rule nests the reaction function that was obtained under
discretionary policy as a special case (equation 30). We want to know if there is a superior
rule and to identify the optimal one. This is done in two steps. First, equilibrium outcomes are
determined under the assumption that monetary policy follows the generic rule (26). Second,
those outcomes are plugged into the monetary policy objective function and the optimal values
of  & and & are chosen.24
When unions are non-atomistic (?	4 ), the solution to this problem shows that the








where ` JR|  *L}k k
￿Ek is the real wage at which the optimal employment level occurs
(*L}u ' k
￿( see subsection 2.4). This leads us to
Proposition 6 ,I ZDJH VHWWHUV DUH QRQDWRPLVWLF WKH RSWLPDO WLPHLQFRQVLVWHQW PRQHWDU\
SROLF\ SURGXFHV D ¿UVW EHVW RXWFRPH ZLWK UHVSHFW WR ERWK LQÀDWLRQ Z ' ZW DQG HPSOR\PHQW
*L}u ' k
￿
3URRI When unions are non-atomistic the optimal & coef¿cient implies that # $4(see
equation 40 and the optimality conditions 45). Equation (41) and the condition # $4imply
that employment and inÀation converge towards their optimal levels.
This result is in sharp contrast with the one obtained with atomistic agents, where
employment is unaffected by the inÀation aversion of monetary policy.
20 Intuitively, the
reaction function (27) leads to a ¿rst best outcome because inÀation rises one-for-one with
the LQGLYLGXDO union’s nominal wage ( _Z
_/￿ ' ? _/
_/￿ ' ), so that no individual union is able to








'f ). From the point of view of each union, an
increase of its individual nominal wage beyond the optimal nominal wage level (ZW n ` JR|)
i sm a t c h e db ya ni d e n t i c a li n c r e a s ei ni n À ation, with no real gains. Hence, under the optimal
monetary rule, unions have no other choice than the optimal nominal wage.
However, the optimal policy is time-inconsistent. It rests on the non-credible threat that
the inÀation response to an increase in the average nominal wage (/) increases linearly with
? But if the policy maker cannot precommit to such a policy, rational unions will realize that
once they have deviated from the optimal nominal wage level (ZW n`JR|), it will not be in the
interest of monetary policy to carry out the threat, as that would lead to excessive inÀation.
53 A ss h o w ni nA p p e n d i xE ,w h e nq$4the optimal commitment rule is  @ ￿.25
 $OWHUQDWLYH VFHQDULRV
The purpose of this section is to study the robustness of the employment effects of
monetary policy with respect to the behavioral assumptions about labor unions. Previous
results were derived under the assumption that unions internalize the general equilibrium
effects of their wages on labor demand (equation 8) while taking dividends as given. Here
we consider two alternative scenarios, respectively with full and nil internalization of general
equilibrium effects. In the former, unions internalize DOO the general equilibrium effects of
their wages, including those on dividends (“fully rational” unions). In the latter unions do not
internalize DQ\ general equilibrium effect (“myopic” unions).
7.1 ³)XOO\ UDWLRQDO´ XQLRQV
When unions do not take dividends as given, the problem solved by each union is
identical to the one analyzed in subsection 3.2 with the only difference that the budget











?3￿ E  k
2 q n 
$&
n 1*L}u￿ 'f  (28)
This expression differs from the ¿rst order condition ("") because of an additional term that
now appears in the square bracket. This term captures the impact effect on dividends, and
hence on consumption, of a unit increase in its nominal wages. It is smaller than zero if ? is
¿nite, showing that higher wages reduce dividends. Since the marginal costs of a unit increase
in the nominal wages of union  are higher than in the case in which dividends are taken













Comparison with the employment level obtained in Section 3 con¿rms that employment is
always larger if unions are fully rational.
21
More importantly for the purpose of this paper, the degree of inÀation aversion of
monetary policy (q) continues to affect employment. Substituting (17) into (29) reveals that
_u
_q : f as long as  	?	4 This shows that the employment effects of the central
bank preferences identi¿ed in Section 4 do not depend on the assumption that unions do not
internalize dividends. Also note that, unlike in Section 4, the effect of higher central bank
inÀation aversion on employment is unambiguously positive. We summarize these results in
Proposition 7 ,I XQLRQV LQWHUQDOL]H WKH HIIHFWV RI WKHLU ZDJHV RQ GLYLGHQGV DQG  	?	4 
 HPSOR\PHQW LV KLJKHU DQG LQÀDWLRQ ORZHU LQ FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK WKH VLWXDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK
GLYLGHQGV DUH WDNHQ DV H[RJHQRXV WR XQLRQV¶ FKRLFHV
 WKH LPSDFW RI WKH FHQWUDO EDQN LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ RQ HPSOR\PHQW LV XQDPELJXRXVO\
SRVLWLYH
7.2 ³0\RSLF´ XQLRQV
We call unions “myopic” if they do not understand that an increase in the aggregate real
wage caused by their own wage setting leads to less production (equation 4) thus reducing
labor demand (equation 2). Under this assumption, the “adverse output” effect that unions
perceived when they accounted for general equilibrium effects (Section 4.1) disappears.
Hence, without the “adverse output” effect, the central bank’s conservatism affects labor
demand elasticity only through the “adverse competitiveness” effect. We showed that the
“adverse competitiveness” effect is smaller if the central bank is more conservative. This
implies that, for  	?	4 , the impact effect of the central bank’s conservatism on
employment is unambiguously negative (_u
_q 	 f).
22
54 If q @4the internalization of dividends leads to a ¿rst best outcome. This occurs because the single
union acts as a social planner who IXOO\ internalizes the general equilibrium effects of wages on the welfare of DOO
workers.
55 In the partial-equilibrium model of Cukierman and Lippi (1999) only an “adverse competitiveness” effect
is at work. This explains why more conservatism reduces employment unambiguosly in their model.27
 &RQFOXGLQJ UHPDUNV
Strategic policy models have proved a useful tool for both positive and normative
analysis of monetary institutions.
23 In particular, after Rogoff’s (1985) seminal paper,
several contributions have used these models to study how the policy maker’s aversion to
inÀation affects economic performance.
24 Usually, these models do not incorporate a detailed
description of the underlying economy. Rather, an aggregate formulation of the supply side
is used (e.g. an expectations augmented aggregate supply curve). Under the assumption
of rational expectations, this characterization of the economy suggests that the monetary
policy attitude towards inÀation (Rogoff’s “conservatism”) does not have permanent (long
run) effects on equilibrium employment.
This paper adds to the above literature in two ways. First, it offers a description of the
private economy that goes beyond the aggregate formulation of most previous models. This
provides a consistent framework to relate the suboptimal employment level of the economy,
and the associated inÀation bias, to the economy’s technology, market structure and the
underlying consumption/leisure preferences of private agents. For instance, the policy maker’s
motive to increase employment above the level it reaches “naturally” in the private economy
arises because of the monopolistic structure of the labor market, which in turn depends on
the imperfect substitutability of labor inputs. Thus, under a EHQHYROHQW policy maker, an
inÀationary bias appears.
Second it shows that, despite the assumption of rational expectations, monetary policy
can have a long-run effect on equilibrium employment if wage bargaining involves large
(non-atomistic) agents. This happens because, when nominal wages are negotiated in an
uncoordinated manner, the central bank’s aversion to inÀation determines each individual
union’s assessment of how much the other unions’ real wages will fall after an increase in
its own nominal wages. For example, when central bank’s aversion to inÀation is low, a large
union perceives that an increase in its own nominal wages, taking as given the nominal wages
56 The relevance of this conceptual structure can hardly be overstated. Cukierman (1998) reports that since
1989, twenty-¿ve countries have upgraded the legal independence of their central banks, compared to only two
in the previous forty years.
57 Recent contributions include Beetsma and Jensen (1999) Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) Lohmann
(1992) Persson and Tabellini (1993), (1999) Svensson (1997) Walsh (1995). Persson and Tabellini (1999,
section 2.3) and Walsh (1998, chapter 8) discuss the assumptions underlying strategic monetary policy models
and survey this voluminous literature.28
of the others, leads to an increase in inÀation and hence to a reduction in the other unions’r e a l
wages. This reduction makes the other unions’ labor more competitive (a partial equilibrium
effect) and changes the economy’s overall production (a general equilibrium effect). Both
effects inÀuence the labor demand faced by the union and, therefore, its employment choices.
The assumption that wages are negotiated in nominal terms is crucial for the result (as it is
crucial for all the literature on strategic monetary policy).
25 However, if unions are atomistic,
and thus neglect the inÀationary impact of their individual actions, structural employment is
unrelated to monetary policy.
The results qualify Rogoff’s proposition about the welfare effects of a “conservative”
central bank. For instance, when conservatism has a negative effect on employment DQG the
government interest in inÀation is “suf¿ciently low”, it may be optimal to appoint a central
bank that attaches a VPDOOHU weight to inÀation than the government. We do not claim that
the previous example, provided mainly to illustrate the potential limitations of a welfare
assessment which neglects the role of large wage-setters, will be the case in practice. We
do claim, however, that the broad implication of our theoretical model is not an artifact.
Preliminary evidence, as provided for instance in Cukierman and Lippi (1999), reveals that
the conservatism of the monetary rule has a detrimental effect on average employment in
continental European countries, where wage bargaining is conducted by large uncoordinated
trade unions, but has no employment effect in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where wage
bargaining is more decentralized. In a similar vein, Cavallari (1999) uses an open economy
version of our model to analyze how the inverse relationship between inÀation and trade
openness, suggested by several papers (e.g. Romer, 1993), is inÀuenced by the presence of
non-atomistic agents. Her model shows that this relationship may disappear in the presence
of non-atomistic agents. This hypothesis is not rejected by a regression analysis of 19 OECD
economies. Overall, further investigation of the consequences of non-atomistic private agents
appears relevant for continental European countries, where non atomistic agents, particularly
labor unions, are an important characteristic of the economy.
58 The assumption of nominal wage wage bargaining is essential, as it implies that each individual union
perceives that it can impose some inÀation on the RWKHU unions, reducing their real wages. This is also due
to the XQFRRUGLQDWHG nature of the bargaining process. Although in equilibrium no union is surprised by the
other unions’i n À ation, the central bank conservatism affects equilibrium employment because it inÀuences each
union’s assessment of the employment consequences of deviating from the equilibrium strategy.$SSHQGLFHV
APPENDIX A: The central bank problem
Equations (10) and (11) are used to write the labor demand equation (8) and the
budget constraint (13) in terms of nominal wages (/￿c/)a n di n À ation (Z). This yields:
*L}￿ ' M￿  k
￿3kE/ Z and *L}u￿ ' M2  ￿
￿3kE/ Zc where M￿ and M2 are expressions
that do not depend on Z and the approximation *L}`￿  ' /￿  Z is used.
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Substitution of this expression for *L}u￿ into (30) yields
Z '
ZWE  k




f E/￿  /_ n /
l
E  k
2 q n 
(31)30
which is the reaction function of monetary policy (i.e. Z) to nominal wages. Equation (14) is
obtained by rearranging the terms.
APPENDIX B: Derivation of a typical union’s ¿rst order condition














with respect to /￿ subject to ￿ ' `￿u￿ n (￿, _Z
_/￿

 /3￿ ' r (equation 15) and taking /3￿ and


















Since the nominal wages of union  members are identical (as implied by the union’s


































the fact that in equilibrium
‘￿u￿
￿￿ ' k (i.e. the labor share in consumption), and the
approximation *L}`￿  ' /￿  Zc the ¿rst order condition can be rewritten as
k















which yields equation (16) in the main text.31
APPENDIX C: Derivation of labor demand elasticity












































/3￿ (calculated in the next subsection) yields equation (35) in the main text.
The Impact of `￿ on `


























since the wage is the same for the workers of union  (label this `￿), and within the group of
the workers belonging to “other unions” (i.e. all `￿ for which  5 c label this `3￿), we can
























































































































where the last equality holds at a symmetric equilibrium (` ' `￿ ' `3￿).
APPENDIX D: Proof of Proposition 5
Let  # be the labor demand elasticity under the independent central bank, given by
equation (17) where  q appears in the place of q The effects of  q on  # are given in Remark
2. The equilibrium values for employment and inÀation, in terms of  qc are obtained by
substituting  # and  q into equations (18) and (19)
Noting that in equilibrium the relation *L} ' k*L}uholds, the welfare function of the
government is obtained by replacing the values for equilibrium consumption, employment and
inÀation into (12). The partial derivative of the resulting expression with respect to  q yields













E  k2 q
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The ¿rst term in the curly bracket captures the marginal impact of a higher  q on workers’
welfare (consumption and leisure). The sign of this impact can be either positive or negative,
depending on the sign of
_￿ #
_￿ q. The second term in the curly bracket is the marginal effect
on government welfare caused by an inÀation reduction. This term is always positive (see
Proposition 3), indicating that, since a higher  q reduces inÀation, it increases government
welfare along the inÀation dimension. Note that this marginal bene¿t is directly related to the
government preference for low inÀation, q
When
_￿ #
_￿ q : f (which occurs if jE  k 	 c see Remark 2), government welfare is





_￿ q 	 f (which occurs if jEk : ) a higher  q produces a marginal cost (lower
workers’ welfare) and a marginal bene¿t( l o w e ri n À ation) to the government. The optimal
choice of  q hence involves a tradeoff. Since (37) is positive for a suf¿ciently high q (evaluated
at  q ' q, it is implied that it is optimal to have a conservative central bank ( q
JR|
:q )i f
the government is suf¿ciently interested in inÀation. As  q increases, the marginal bene¿tt e r m
converges towards zero faster than the marginal cost (i.e. with a higher in¿nitesimal order),
whichimpliesthat thereexistsa“suf¿ciently large” valueof  q at which (37) is negative. Hence
the optimal  q is ¿nite. This proves part . Analogous reasoning for the case in which q is “so
small” that the marginal cost exceeds the marginal bene¿t( e v a l u a t e da t q'q  cproves part
.
APPENDIX E: Derivation of the optimal (time-inconsistent) policy
Substituting the labor demand equation (8) into (26), yields the reaction function of
monetary policy to nominal wages (as in Appendix A):
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(rSc under commitment, is the equivalent of r under discretion). The labor demand elasticity

















E  k? n &E?  
 (40)
Equilibrium outcomes under commitment are obtained from the unions’ ¿rst order condition
(16) and from the monetary policy reaction function (26), using (40) and assuming that in























































































jE  k  
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2 'f  (44)
For ? $4 cor jE  k' cequation (44) is equal to zero, showing that & does not
affect welfare when unions are atomistic. In this case, the optimal rule is Z ' ZW (as implied
by 43 for any &).
For ¿nite ?, the objective function has a global maximum (the second order conditions
for a maximum are satis¿ed) at
;
A A A ?
A A A =
















if jE  k 	 
(45)
The optimal & coef¿cient with non-atomistic unions implies that the labor demand
elasticity (#S), as perceived by each union, diverges towards 4 as & converges towards the
value
E￿3k￿?
?3￿ (from above or from below depending on the size of j Replacing the optimal
coef¿cients into (38) yields equation (27) in the text.5HIHUHQFHV
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